"". . .While "one for the blonde" is Pareto-optimal, the Nash/Crowe configuration is not, since anyone will be better off by switching to the blonde while the rest will not be worse off. So the "best for the group" promised by Nash/Crowe comes from strategic choices that differ from his proposed tactics...""
Of course it is hard to guess the balances of a fictional situation, but the Nash/Crowe solution still seems more elegant.. Why? Assuming 1950/early 60's cartoon manners and mores, the brunettes are used to the blonde getting all the attention. A pact to shun the blonde not only avoids irritating the brunettes: it flatters them, and therefore increases the chances of the suitors. It breaks the narrative / rules of the game. Add that the blonde is used to all the attention, there is no guarantee that Cloony ex-machina gets lucky either, or any of the suitors who switch to the blonde at the last minute get anything but a bit of a tease.
Also; any ONE of the suitors suddenly going for the blonde will focus the attention of the brunettes upon the blonde, leave them wondering if they got the beta male again, and introduce jealousy, distortion, and return to a well worn pattern of "equilibrium" that results in inconclusive retro courting behaviour and ultimately an unresolved situation for the suitors. Bye bye flattery effect for the brunettes!
The shrewdness of the Nash/Crowe strategy is to infer that if there is a potential for competition and cooperation among the boys, there must also be similar potential amongst the girls. So this is a bit like "chicken" too: colluding boys try to push colluding girls into a state of competition (at least with the blonde).
Unfortunately, I do not have enough economic theory under my belt to translate the above into competing models, but I suspect that the "elegance" or "attractiveness" of the narrative derives from something that is buried deep within the idea of social games itself - that the rules and situations can be cleverly broken, bent and/or re-written.